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Ina Mane Johnson will be referred to throughout this brief as "Mrs, Johnson" for 
purposes of consistency. It should be noted that Ina has been divorced from Neldon Johnson and 
has remarried. 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."2 Section 78-2a-
3(2)(h) of the Utah Code, provides that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
appeals from the district court for domestic relations cases, including divorce, This is an 
appeal from the final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court regarding a domestic 
relations case. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the lack of essential contract terms regarding the trust deed and trust deed note 
and the number of parcels to be transferred make the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce 
ambiguous and/or unenforceable? 
Standard of Review; Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no 
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah 1999), 
2. Did the modifications of the trust deed and trust deed note by the Court, without 
the consent of Mr. Johnson, make the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous 
and/or unenforceable? 
2
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. 
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Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no 
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah 1999). 
3. Was the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or unenforceable 
because the parties failed to have a meeting of the minds on the integral features of how 
many parcels were going to be deeded to Mrs. Johnson and the terms and conditions of the 
trust deed and trust deed note? 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no 
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah 1999). 
4. Was the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or unenforceable 
because it lacked sufficient defmiteness to be enforced? 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no 
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah 1999). 
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5. Is the use of contempt proceedings barred by the one-action rule in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-37-1 where the parties agreed in the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce that 
a trust deed and trust deed note would secure the property settlement? 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no 
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas, Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah 1999). Legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of a statute are 
reviewed for correctness, and therefore the Court of Appeals should apply a de novo standard 
here. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). 
6. Does the use of contempt proceedings violate article I, section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution where the contempt proceedings are used to enforce a property settlement 
secured by a trust deed and trust deed note, where the property settlement does not involve 
either alimony payments or child support payments? 
Standard of Review: A matter "of statutory interpretation [is] a question of law that 
we review on appeal for correctness." State v. Schofield, 63 P.3d 667 (Utah 2002). 
7. Is the use of contempt proceedings prior to July 1, 2006 appropriate when the 
parties agreed in the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce that a balloon payment on July 
1, 2006 would be used to pay for any outstanding payments under the Amended Decree of 
Divorce? 
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Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no 
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah 1999). 
8. Was it erroneous for Judge Howard to hold that the issues in Mr. Johnson's Motion 
to Set Aside Decree of Divorce dated January 13, 2006 were res judicata. 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether res judicata bars an action 
presents a question of law. "When reviewing questions of law, we accord no particular 
deference to the conclusions of law made by the court but review them for correctness." State 
v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 535 (Utah 1993). 
9. Was it erroneous for Judge Howard to award a judgment to Mrs. Johnson in the 
amount of $223,982.97 for monthly payments under the stipulated Amended Decree of 
Divorce when two parcels of property had been inadvertently deeded to Mrs. Johnson, where 
the value of the property far exceeded the amount owing and where the monthly payments 
had been secured by a trust deed and trust deed note and the parties had stipulated to a 
balloon payment in July 2006 for any past due payments. 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law. 
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no 
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575, 
578 (Utah 1999). 
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10. Was it eiToneous for Judge Howard to award attorney's fees incurred by Mrs. 
Johnson prior to the filing of the order to show cause? 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question 
of law [that] we review for correctness.'" A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heatuig v. Guy, 47 
P.3d 92 (Utah App. 2002)(citation omitted), affd, 94 P.3d 270 (2004). 
11. Was it erroneous for Judge Howard to award attorney's fees to Mrs. Johnson for 
any fees other than those incurred for preparation and attendance of the January 23, 2006 
hearing. 
Standard of Review; Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question 
of law [that] we review for correctness.'11 A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 47 
P.3d 92 (Utah App. 2002)(citation omitted), affd, 94 P.3d 270 (2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This matter is a divorce case. The parties reached a stipulated settlement that was 
entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court as an Amended Decree of Divorce. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
The district court entered a Decree of Divorce on June 6, 2001. (R. 309-310). The 
decree was based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the district court 
on the same date. (R. 307-308), Thereafter, the parties reached a stipulated settlement 
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agreement that was read into the record and accepted by the district court and memorialized 
in the Amended Decree of Divorce (Appendix 1., R. 320 - 326) and the Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Appendix 2., R. 311-318). Pursuant to the Amended 
Decree of Divorce, Mr. Johnson's counsel prepared a trust deed, trust deed note and quit-
claim deed. Mr. Johnson signed the trust deed note, the trust deed and the quit claim deed 
on August 28, 2002. (R. 834-838). The trust deed was recorded on September 4, 2002 as 
entry 102294:2002 with the Utah County Recorder. (R. 833-834). The quit-claim deed was 
recorded on September 4, 2002 as Entry No. 102293:2002 with the Utah County Recorder. 
R. 828-831). Mr. Johnson's counsel filed a Notice of Execution and Recordation of Deeds 
and Execution of Note with the district court on September 24, 2002. (R. 840). The notice 
contained a copy of the executed and recorded trust deed, trust deed note and quit-claim 
deed. (R. 828-840). Mrs. Johnson subsequently requested an order to show cause hearing 
alleging that Mr. Johnson was in contempt of court for not making the monthly payments 
under the decree of divorce. (R. 1824). The matter was presented to Commissioner Patton 
wherein Commissioner Patton denied Mrs. Johnson's Order to Show Cause, but unilaterally, 
without any objection from Mrs. Johnson or her counsel, found the trust deed recorded by 
Mr. Johnson was "contemptuous" and Commissioner Patton was "offended by the trust 
deed." See March 7, 2003 Hearing, pg. 46 lines 1-4 and pg. 47 lines 5-8 (R. 1824). The 
Commissioner ordered Mrs. Johnson's counsel to prepare a new trust deed with an 
acceleration clause that if Mr. Johnson was not current by December 1, 2003 on his 
obligations under the trust deed note then the entire outstanding balance becomes due and 
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payable on the entire outstanding balance. Id. at pg. 49, lines 8-15 (R. 1824). Mr. Johnson's 
counsel filed an objection to the trust deed and trust deed note prepared by Mrs. Johnson's 
counsel that was heard before Judge Claudia Laycock on July 28, 2003. (R. 1 823) 
At the July 28, 2003 hearing, Judge Laycock granted Mr, Johnson's objection in part, 
denied it in part, and ordered Mrs. Johnson's counsel to amend the trust deed note. See July 
28,2003 Hearing, pg. 70 lines 11-17 (R. 1823). Judge Laycock also reviewed Mr. Johnson's 
Motion to Set Aside the Amended Decree of Divorce. Id. at pg. 70. Judge Laycock found 
the decree unambiguous. Id. at pg. 74 lines 6-12. The Order Denying the Motion to Set 
Aside the Divorce Decree was never signed by Judge Laycock, but was eventually signed by 
Judge Howard on February 7, 2006. R. 1704-1707. In addition, Judge Howard signed 
several other unsigned orders from matters that had been before Judge Laycock, including 
the Order Denying Objection to Prior Order of Attorney's Fees (R. 1715-1717), Order on 
Objection to Order on Order to Show Cause (R. 1712-1714), Order Regarding Objection 
Regarding Community Service (R. 1708-1711), and the Order on Objections to Trust Deed 
and Trust Deed Note R. (1699-1703). As the record reflects, none of the orders signed by 
Judge Howard were sent to Mr. Johnson's counsel, but the orders were signed with the 
originate certificate of mailing dated July 30, 2003. On February 23, 2006, the district court 
entered a subsequent ruling and order entitled "Ruling and Order: Re Respondent's Objection 
to Newly Prepared Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed." (R. 1731-1735). A copy of the order 
was sent to Mr. Johnson's counsel by the district court. (R. 1731). On the same date, the 
district court entered a ruling entitled "Ruling Re: Order to Show Cause." (R. 1737-1741). 
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Finally, the district court entered an order entitled "Order, In Re: January 23, 2006 Hearing" 
that was signed by the district court on February 27, 2006. (R. 1758-1761). 
Facts established in the Record below: 
1. The parties in the present action were married on May 3, 1964. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact |^ 2. (R. 307-308) 
2. The parties were divorced on June 6, 2001 in a bifurcated proceeding. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law ]ffl 1-2. (R. 307) 
3. An Amended Decree of Divorce was negotiated between the parties and entered on 
June 27, 2001. (R. 311-326) 
4. Both parties were represented by counsel during the negotiated settlement and 
corresponding Amended Decree of Divorce. Amended Decree of Divorce, pg. 1. (R. 
326). 
5. The Amended Decree of Divorce does not award any alimony to Mrs. Johnson. See 
Amended Decree ^ 11. (R. 320). 
6. The Amended Decree awards Mrs. Johnson the real property at 5629 West 6400 
South in American Fork. Amended Decree^ 3(A). (R. 325). This property has been 
deeded to Mrs. Johnson. (R. 828-831) 
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The Amended Decree awards Mrs. Johnson the real property at 512 South 860 East, 
American Fork, Utah. Amended Decree |^ 3(B). (R. 326). This property has been 
deeded to Mrs. Johnson. (R. 828-831) 
In addition to the property described in the Amended Decree and set forth in 
paragraph 6 and 7 above, Mrs, Johnson was inadvertently deeded two additional 
parcels that were not contemplated under the Amended Decree of Divorce. (R. 828-
831). 
The Decree of Divorce awards Mrs. Johnson the sum of $2,800,000, the real property 
and funds in the Smith Barney account. Amended Decree % 5. (R. 322-323). 
Payment of the $2,800,000 is to be paid in a monthly payment of $8,3333.33, 
commencing July 1, 2001. Amended Decree f^ 5. (R. 322). 
Any amounts still due and owing on July 1, 2006, shall be paid in full with one 
balloon payment due no later than July 1, 2006. Amended Decree 1^ 5(b). (R, 322) 
The following sentence was crossed-out, deleted and initialed by the parties, "In the 
event payment is not timely made, the entire balance shall become immediately due 
and payable." Amended Decree ^ 5(d). (R. 322) 
In the Amended Decree, the parties specifically negotiated that Mrs. Johnson receive 
a secured interest in the "U-Check" real and personal property, to include all 
inventory, and that Mrs. Johnson shall be a lien holder in the second position behind 
the existing loan at Zion's bank in the approximate balance of $600,000. Amended 
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Decree ^ 5(e). (R. 322). The parties inserted the phrase, "Security to be a trust deed 
and trust deed note." Amended Decree Tj 5(e). (R. 322). 
13. Mr. Johnson signed the trust deed note, the trust deed and the quit claim deed on 
August 28, 2002. (R. 834-838). Mr. Johnson's counsel filed a Notice of Execution 
and Recordation of Deeds and Execution of Note with the district court on September 
24, 2002. (R. 840). The notice contained a copy of the executed Trust Deed, Trust 
Deed Note and Quit-Claim Deed. (R. 828-840). 
14. Mr. Johnson recorded the trust feed on September 4, 2002 as entry 102294:2002 with 
the Utah County Recorder. (R. 833-834) 
15. Mr. Johnson sent a copy of the Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed to the Court and 
to counsel for Mrs. Johnson on September 24, 2002. (R. 839-840) 
16. Mrs. Johnson requested an order to show cause hearing alleging that Mr. Johnson was 
in contempt of court for not making the monthly payment under the decree of divorce. 
(R. 1824) 
17. During the oral argument, Commissioner Patton asked Mr. Johnson's counsel for a 
copy of the trust deed and trust deed note that had been signed and recorded by Mr. 
Johnson. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824, pg. 42 lines 20-22). 
18. Commissioner Patton, sua sponte, took a ten minute recess so that he could review the 
documents in chambers. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824, pg. 42 lines 5-6). 
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19. When Commissioner Patton returned to the hearing, he asked Mr. Johnson's counsel 
why Mrs. Johnson had not signed either the trust deed or the trust deed note. March 
7, 2003 (Hearing R. 1824 pg. 43 lines 6-7). 
20. At the time of the March 7, 2003 hearing, Mrs. Johnson and her counsel had been in 
possession of the trust deed and trust deed note for seven months. They had been 
delivered to Mrs, Johnson's counsel on September 24, 2002. (R. 839-840), During 
this seven month period, neither Mrs. Johnson nor her counsel had ever objected to 
the form of the trust deed or the trust deed note. 
21. Commissioner Patton, sua sponte and without any pending objection before the Court 
or prompting by either party or their counsel, announced that the Court was 
"offended" by the trust deed note and Commissioner Patton announced that the trust 
deed note was "contemptuous." March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824 pgs. 45-49). 
22. Specifically, Commissioner Patton found that the following non-recourse language 
contained in the note was offensive, "[i]f maker fails to pay any payment provided by 
this note when due, the exclusive remedy of the holder of the Trust Deed and this note 
shall be the foreclosure of the Trust Deed and the holder shall not be entitled to 
recover from maker any deficiency under this note." March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824 
pgs. 46-47). 
23. Commissioner Patton argued that under the case of Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 
(Utah App. 1987), Mrs. Johnson was not bound by the Promissory Note because she 
had not signed the same. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824 pg. 47 lines 8-17). 
24. Commissioner Patton then instructed Mrs. Johnson to draft a new trust deed note, 
changing the terms and conditions of the stipulated settlement, and ordered Mr. 
Johnson to sign the note. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824 pg. 48 lines 5-12). 
26. At the July 28, 2003 Hearing, Judge Laycock attempted to draft a trust deed from the 
bench by ordering Mrs. Johnson's counsel to amend the trust deed prepared by her. 
See July 28, 2003 Hearing, pg. 70 lines 11-17 (R. 1823). 
27. At the July 28,2003 hearing, Mr. Johnson, through counsel, objected to the trust deed 
and trust deed note several times. See July 28, 2003 Hearing (R. 1823). 
28. The parties have been unable to agree on the terms and conditions of a trust deed 
note. Judge Howard has now ordered that Mr. Johnson sign a trust deed prepared by 
Mrs. Johnson's counsel. Ruling and Order dated February 23, 2006 (R. 1789-1793). 
Mrs. Johnson filed an Order to Show Cause on April 29, 2005. 
SUMMARY OF ARC UMENTS 
1. This case involves a stipulated divorce decree that lacks the essential terms to 
be properly enforced by the Court. Several motions and hearings have been held to try and 
decipher, modify, clarify, interpret, create, reconstruct and enforce a divorce decree that lacks 
essential terms and is ambiguous. The district court's ruling that the stipulated decree of 
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divorce was not ambiguous should be reversed because the stipulated decree is subject to 
se\ cral interpretations with respect to the number of parcels deeded to Mrs. Jolinson and the 
terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note. In addition, the parties never had 
a meeting of the minds on the essential terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed 
note. Mr. Johnson understood that the trust deed would be a non-recourse trust deed at the 
time of the stipulated settlement. Mrs. Johnson claims that the trust deed was not a non-
recourse trust deed. The stipulated settlement and the Amended Decree of Di\ orce are both 
silent on the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note. Therefore, the decree 
is ambiguous and the court should look to parol evidence to clarify the meaning of the decree 
or find the agreement unenforceable. 
2. The stipulated settlement and subsequent decree of divorce based upon that 
stipulation was the result of the negotiation between Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson. Both 
parties were represented by counsel during the negotiations. The district court did not have 
the authority to modify the terms of the stipulation or supply missing terms, unless such terms 
or conditions were statutorily mandated (such as child support). The district court's 
unilateral modification of the stipulation, by drafting language to insert into the trust deed 
and trust deed note, materially changed the stipulation between the parties and created a new 
agreement without the consent of Mr. Johnson. The modification of a stipulated settlement 
must be consented to by the parties making the stipulation. Otherwise, there is no meeting 
of the minds or mutual consent and the agreement is void. 
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3. Where the parties have voluntarily agreed to secure payment in a property 
settlement agreement with a trust deed, the plain language of the agreement requires the use 
of the trust deed to collect and overdue payment under the stipulated property settlement. 
The application of the one-action rule at Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-1 also serves to place 
the personal assets of Mr. Johnson beyond the reach of Mrs. Johnson until the value of the 
pledged property is exhausted. 
4. A contempt proceeding violates Article I, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution-
prohibiting imprisonment for debt- and therefore the trial court has no power to order 
payments on the property settlement or to use the contempt sanction to enforce the stipulated 
divorce decree. 
5. Res Judicata does not apply to Mr. Johnson's Motion to Set Aside the Divorce 
Decree because the prior proceeding did not meet the four elements required to be present 
for res judicata. Neither the district court or Mrs. Johnson provided any analysis on the four 
elements required for issue preclusion. 
6. The award of attorney's fees was erroneous because the Court awarded attorney's 
fees incurred for motions not before the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce is Not Enforceable 
The alleged divorce decree lacks the integral features that are essential to the 
formation of an enforceable agreement. For the reasons set forth below, the district court 
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should have set aside the decree of divorce and allowed the parties to either renegotiate the 
decree on mutually agreeable terms and conditions or set the case for trial. Instead, the 
district court entered a ruling and order requiring Mr. Johnson to sign the newly prepared 
trust deed and trust deed note that Mr. Johnson did not agree to nor was the newly prepared 
trust deed or trust deed note part of the stipulation between the parties. Ruling and Order Re: 
Respondent's Objections to Newly Prepared Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed (R. 1800-
1804). 
A. No Meeting of the Minds 
In Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, the Utah Supreme Court noted that , r a meeting of the minds 
on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract"' and, 
consequently, lp[a]n agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite."1 78 P.3d 600, 
602 (Utah 2003) {quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsem, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996)). 
"It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is 
essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are 
indefinite "Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) 
(citations omitted); see also Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427,428 (Utah 1961) ("A condition 
precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the 
parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness 
to be enforced."). 
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It has become painfully apparent to everyone involved in this proceeding that there 
was no meeting of the minds with respect to the security pledged in the amended decree of 
divorce. In the amended decree of divorce, the parties negotiated that Mrs. Johnson receive 
a secured interest in the "U-Check" real and personal property, to include all inventory, and 
that Mrs. Johnson become a lien holder in the second position behind the existing loan at 
Zion's bank in the approximate balance of $600,000. Amended Decree of Divorce ^ 5(e). 
(R. 322). The parties both initialed a handwritten provision in the payment section of the 
decree "Security to be a trust deed and trust deed note." Amended Decree |^ 5(e) (R. 322). 
Mr. Johnson provided a trust deed and trust deed note that was never objected to by Mrs. 
Johnson. Mr. Johnson believed at the time of the negotiated decree that the sole recourse of 
Mrs. Johnson would be to exercise her security interest in the store. Mrs. Johnson now 
claims that she believed that the security provided in the real and personal property of the Li-
Check store was not provided as her only recourse, as has been evidenced in her several 
motions for contempt and attempts to receive payment by attacking the personal assets of Mr. 
Johnson. Therefore, there was no meeting of the minds on this essential and critical point 
of the divorce decree and therefore the decree must be set aside. 
In addition to the lack of understanding with respect to the security set forth in the 
Amended Decree, there was no meeting of the minds with respect to the real property 
distributed to the parties. Mrs. Johnson was inadvertently deeded two parcels of property that 
were neither authorized nor contemplated by the divorce decree. July 28,2003 Hearing, pgs. 
53-77 (R. 1823). Mrs. Johnson has taken the position that the real property was correctly 
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deeded to her. Mr. Johnson never contemplated nor understood that the divorce decree 
awarded these two parcels to Mrs. Johnson. The district court judge refused to receive and 
consider evidence regarding the original written stipulation of the parties that would have 
clarified the ambiguity. See July 28, 2003 Hearing, pg. 59 lines 4-7. (R. 1823). There was 
no meeting of the minds with respect to this critical provision in the amended decree of 
divorce and therefore it should be set aside. The extremely harsh result of attempting to 
enforce this aspect of the decree gives Mrs. Johnson a huge windfall and violates the 
equitable principles upon which the district court acting in domestic casses is founded. As 
set forth in the Amended Decree, both provisions referencing specific acreage of land were 
struck by the parties. See Amended Decree, Tflf 3(A) and 3(B). (R, 324-325). The 
subsequent conveyance of the acreage struck by the parties creates a tremendous windfall to 
Mrs. Johnson that the district court has refused to acknowledge or accept in the proceedings 
below. 
B. Utah Courts Not Authorized To Fabricate Contracts 
Utah Courts are not authorized to rewrite, modify or fabricate contract terms and 
conditions where the parties have failed to complete an agreement. In short, "where there 
was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered into in the future, 
the court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and enforce 
it." Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1961). Commissioner Patton has 
unilaterally attempted to rewrite, modify and alter the terms and conditions of the amended 
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decree of divorce by imposing his own terms and conditions in the trust deed and trust deed 
note. Order to Show Cause Hearing of March 7, 2003, pgs. 42- 51. (R. 1824). The district 
court is not authorized to write or modify the divorce decree, when the parties had carefully 
negotiated the terms and conditions. Therefore, the amended decree of divorce should be set 
aside and the district court should give the parties the opportunity to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of the settlement. 
C. Future Negotiations Make Contract Incomplete and Unenforceable 
If there is "any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations or considerations 
to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no contract 
at all.n Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah 1926). The amended decree o( 
divorce does not set forth the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note. 
Because the terms and conditions of this critical part of the decree are left for future 
negotiations, there is not a completed contract and the matter must be set aside. "It is 
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential 
to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite." 
Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citing Pingree v. Cont'l 
Group of Utah, Inc.,55S P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976)); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 
428 (1961)) (additional citations omitted); see also Candland v. Oldroyd,248?. 1101, 1102 
(1926) ("So long as there is any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations or 
considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there 
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is no contract at all"). The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the 
parties' intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually existed, there can 
be no contract to enforce. 
D, Lack of Essential Terms Make Contract Invalid 
"A contract may be enforced even though some contract terms may be missing or left 
to be agreed upon, but if the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for 
deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract." Acad. 
Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (111. 1991) (citations omitted). 
"Whether or not the [missing term] was essential to the contract requires an examination of 
the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into." 
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). Merely satisfying the 
minimum requirements for the statute of frauds does not automatically render all contracts 
sufficiently definite to be enforced by the courts. The terms and conditions of the trust deed 
and trust deed note are essential terms to the decree of divorce. Because the parties failed 
to negotiate the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note, the decree must 
be set aside. 
E. Contract Unenforceable if Lacks Sufficient Defmiteness to be Enforced 
An unenforceable agreement to agree occurs when parties to a contract fail to agree 
on material terms of the contract "with sufficient defmiteness to be enforced." Cottonwood 
Malt Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 
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428 (Utah 1961)). The present action provides a living example of what happens when 
material terms are omitted from an agreement and then one of the parties attempts to enforce 
the agreement. In this case, Petitioner has attempted to enforce the agreement via contempt 
proceedings, when her exclusive remedy under Utah's one-action rule is to proceed against 
the security of the trust deed and trust deed note in the U-check real and personal property. 
The terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note have not been finalized, 
negotiated or completed by the parties, therefore the amended decree is impossible to enforce 
and should be set aside. 
F. To Be Valid, Modification Requires Mutual Consent, Not Unilateral Modification 
"[Pjarties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of a contract." 
Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 877 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quotations and citation omitted). "A valid modification of a contract... requiresr a meeting 
of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with 
sufficient definiteness.m Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 
1996) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d427,428 (1961)); see Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d 
214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999)(noting that to "alter, or supplant a contract fairly made,""[t]he same 
meeting of the minds is needed that was necessary to make the contract in the first place" 
(quotations, emphasis, and citation omitted)). ""[Contractual mutual assent requires assent 
by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms." 
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048,1050 (Utah \918);seealsoSacklerv. Savin, 897 
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P.2d 1217, 1220-22 (Utah 1995) (holding that to form an enforceable contract, there must 
be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement). 
In the present action, Commissioner Patton unilaterally ordered Mrs. Johnson to draft 
the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note and Judge Howard's February 
23, 2006 Order now requires that Mr. Johnson sign a trust deed and trust deed note that he 
did not agree to nor were the terms and conditions set forth in the Amended Decree of 
Divorce. The district court's unilateral modification of the divorce decree is a contract 
modification without mutual consent and therefore invalid. It is axiomatic that both parties 
to the agreement must consent to and agree upon the terms and conditions of the trust deed 
and trust deed note. The district court does not have the ability to force one party to agree 
to a modification to a stipulated decree of divorce. Therefore, the decision of the district 
court requiring Mr. Johnson to sign the newly prepared trust deed and trust deed note should 
be reversed. 
II. The Use of Contempt Proceedings are Barred by the Stipulated Amended 
Decree of Divorce and the Utah One-Action Rule 
The trial court summarily dismissed Mr. Johnson's request to apply the one-action rule 
and provisions of the trust deed statute to this proceeding. See R. 1758-1761. No 
explanation or reasoning is set forth in the Court's ruling. Id. The entire analysis set forth 
in the trial court's order states, "[t]he issue of the "one action rule" was raised by the 
Respondent and the court held that the one-action rule did not apply to the proceedings held 
on January 23, 2006." Id. at 1760. The lack of analysis set forth in the record below is 
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sufficient cause to remand the proceeding to the trial court for a full explanation of why the 
one action doesn't apply to the facts of this proceeding. However, the court of appeals can 
give guidance to the trial court on remand. 
First and foremost, the parties agreed in the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce 
to use a trust deed and trust deed note to secure payments to Mrs. Johnson. Instead of 
foreclosing on the trust deed, Mrs. Johnson has attempted, through contempt proceedings, 
to attack the personal assets of Mr. Johnson. The protections provided in the Utah Trust 
Deed Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19 et seq. and Utah's one-action rule require that Mrs. 
Johnson foreclose on the trust deed. 
In Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court 
found that the Utah Trust Deed Act did not concern itself with which contract or instrument 
the action is founded on, but rather the issue is whether the action is one to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security. Id. at 3. In 
Smith, the Utah Supreme Court applied the protections of the Trust Deed Act to guarantors 
as well as debtors, finding that the act makes no distinctions as to whether the action is 
brought against the debtor or a guarantor. Under the Trust Deed Act, after a breach of an 
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security, the trustee is given the power 
of sale by which the trustee may cause the trust property to be sold pursuant to the Trust 
Deed Act. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23. 
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The one-action rule provides that "[tjhere can be but one action for the recovery of 
any debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate...." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has declared that 
"[t]he underlying purpose of the single-action statute is to preclude the creditor from waiving 
the security and suing directly on the contract to pay money and hold the debtor rather than 
the security primarily liable." APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah App. 1996)(citations 
omitted). Under this rule, "[a] creditor must foreclose and have a deficiency determined by 
the court proceeding against the debtor personally." City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815 
P.2d 234, 235 (Utah 1991 )(citations omitted). Utah courts have applied the one-action rule 
to prevent personal liability on the part of the debtor until after foreclosure or sale of the 
security and then only for the deficiency then remaining unpaid. Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P.3d 
699, 704 (Utah 2003) citing Lockhart v, Equitable Realty Co,, 657 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Utah 
1983). "The one-action represents a policy preference that, when available, real property 
collateral be used before the debtor's personal assets to satisfy debts. One commentator has 
observed that absent this security-first requirement, the creditor could 'dispose of any of a 
debtor's assets the creditor chooses and disrupt the debtors preferences in that regard, A 
creditor's method of disposing of the assets also could realize fewer net proceeds than a 
method chosen by a debtor.' J. David Milliner, Real Property Collateral: The "One-Action 
Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L.Rev. 557, 559." APS, 927 P.2d at 673. 
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The one-action rule's requirement that the security be exhausted first is primarily 
intended to protect the debtor. However, the rule does not impair the right of the creditor to 
recover on its loan. Id. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 'The purpose of the one-
action rule is to regulate the procedure of recovery of a secured creditor, not to deny the 
creditor's contract right to recover on its loan/' APS, 927 P.2d at 673 (citations 
omitted)."The fundamental lesson to be drawn from our cases interpreting the one action rule 
is that the primary objective is to place the personal assets of a mortgagor beyond the reach 
of a mortgagee until the value of the pledged property is exhausted." Dewsnup, 86 P.3d at 
705. 
Utah courts have extended the reach of the one-action rule to trust deeds. Although 
the rule speaks in terms of a "mortgage/1 Utah cases, as well as cases from many other 
jurisdictions, have held that the one-action rule applies to trust deeds, as in this divorce 
proceeding, as well as to mortgages. City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 236 
(Utah 1991); See also First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 181 
(D.Utah 1987); Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d at 43; Hetland, Deficiency 
Judgment Limitations in California: A New Judicial Approach, 51 Cal. L.Rev. 1,35 (1963); 
Keeverv. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Nev. 1980). Justice Traynor, in a case 
interpreting the California one-action rule, emphasized that the effect of the one-action rule 
is to limit a creditor's means of enforcing its debt but not the right to recover: 
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In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a creditor secured by a trust deed or 
mortgage on real property may recover the full amount of the debt upon 
default. He may realize the security or sue on the obligation or both. . . . In 
most states now, however, the creditor's right to enforce such a debt is 
restricted by statute. . . . [T]he creditor must rely upon his security before 
enforcing the debt. RoseleafCorp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.2d 35, 36, 378 P.2d 
97, 98, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 874 (1963) (emphasis added). Peters, 815 P.2d at 
236. 
Utah's one-action rule provides that "[t]here can be but one action for the recovery 
of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate.../' 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals relied on the 
language of the one-action statute, inteipreted in accordance with the purpose of the rule, in 
finding that comakers who provide none of the security on a loan are nevertheless protected 
by the one-action rule. APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah App. 1996). 
In Briggs, four parties signed a trust deed note, which held them jointly and severally 
liable to pay $75,000. The note was secured by a trust deed executed solely by only one of 
the parties. The Utah Court of Appeals applied the one-action rule to prevent the personal 
liability of the three individuals that did not provide security based on the following broad 
language in the one-action rule: uany debt...secured by mortgage upon real estate." Id, "The 
statute does not contain language restricting the rule's application to only those debts secured 
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by that particular debtor's real property. The lack of such restrictive language suggests that 
whether the debtor and the mortgagor are the same party or are two different parties is of no 
consequence. In either case the debt is secured by the mortgage and all primary debtors are 
entitled to the protections of the one-action rule." Id. 
The broad language in the one-action rule statute that "any debt" or "any right" 
secured by a trust deed is subject to the one-action rule makes the statute applicable to the 
stipulated agreement between the parties. Although Mrs. Johnson claims the one-action rule 
is inapplicable because the property settlement does not constitute a debt, the one-action rule 
applies to the "enforcement of any right" secured by a trust deed. The broad language of the 
statute, as well as the purpose behind the one-action rule, support applying the rule to the 
present case. The litigious nature of the parties often present in domestic disputes can be 
minimized by application of the one-action rule where parties to such disputes agree to secure 
payments by use of trust deeds and trust deed notes. Therefore, the decision of the trial court 
finding the one-action rule inapplicable should be reversed. 
III. Contempt Proceedings Violate The Utah Constitution 
Mr. Johnson filed an objection to Mrs. Johnson's use of contempt proceedings in the 
underlying case based on Article 1, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution- prohibiting 
imprisonment for debt. The district court's reliance upon Hamilton v. Regan, 938 P.2d 282 
(Utah 1997) and Bott v. Bott, 453 P.2d 402 (Utah 1969) to find that the contempt proceeding 
did not violate the constitution was misplaced. Ruling Re: Order to Show Cause. See R. 
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1738 - 1739. In addition, the district court relied upon the holding in Bott and viewed the 
monthly payments under the stipulated divorce decree as payments for support and 
maintenance, despite the fact that the stipulated divorce decree specifically states that no 
alimony is awarded. Because the district court turned the monthly payments into support and 
maintenance payments under Bott, then support and maintenance was statutorily terminated 
by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) when Mrs. Johnson remarried over four years ago. 
In Hamilton v Regan, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding 
of contempt and placing defendant in jail for twenty days when he failed to pay past due 
child support. The defendant argued that the contempt proceeding violated article I, section 
16 of the Utah Constitution, prohibiting imprisonment for debt. The Utah Supreme Court 
found that the courts could use the contempt power for enforcement purposes to safeguard 
the interests and welfare of children. The Court, citing Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P.2d 231, 
232-33 (Utah 1971), stated that contempt measures are better suited to the purpose of 
protecting the interests and welfare of children. In the present case, there are no minor 
children at issue and therefore the reasoning in Hamilton and Harmon do not apply to this 
proceeding. 
Likewise, the holding in Bott is not applicable to this proceeding because the decree 
in Bott did not provide a trust deed and trust deed note as a means of securing the monthly 
payments. In the present action, the parties both agreed that a trust deed and trust deed note 
would secure the monthly payments. By holding contempt proceedings, the district court 
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completely changes the agreement of the parties and imposes conditions on Mr. Johnson that 
he did not agree to in the stipulated decree. In the decree, the parties agreed that the trust 
deed and trust deed note would secure the monthly payments, not contempt proceedings. In 
tact, the parties struck the acceleration provision in the decree that would have made the 
entire property settlement due upon untimely payments. The parties contemplated, negotiated 
and agreed upon the use of the trust deed and trust deed note as security for the property 
settlement. The district court does not have the jurisdiction to ignore the parties agreement 
and impose contempt proceedings in place of the trust deed and trust deed note. 
Finally, the district court relied upon the decision in Bott to reclassify the monthly 
payment due under the divorce decree as support and maintenance. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(9), support and maintenance was terminated when Mrs. Johnson remarried over 
four years ago. Therefore, the monthly payments are no longer due and the matter is moot. 
The district court can't have it both ways, viewing the monthly payments as support and 
maintenance for purposes of the contempt power, but viewing the payments as a property 
settlement for purposes of section 30-3-5(9). Therefore, should the monthly payments 
continue to be classified as support and maintenance payments for Mrs. Johnson under Bott, 
then the payments are no longer due since Mrs. Johnson remarried over four years ago. 
IV. Res Judicata Not Applicable to Motion to Set Aside 
The trial court found that the issues set forth in Mr. Johnson's Motion to Set Aside 
the Decree of Divorce filed on January 13, 2006 were already addressed and ruled on at a 
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hearing held on July 28, 2003 before the Honorable Judge Claudia Laycock. See Ruling 
Re: Petitioner's Objection to Notice to Submit in Re: Respondent's Motion to Set Aside 
Decree of Divorce, pg. 2 (R. 1780-1781). While the trial court failed to make a specific 
finding whether the basis of the decision was issue preclusion or claim preclusion, it 
appears that the trial court relied upon issue preclusion as the basis for its decision. A 
trial court's determination of whether res judicata bars an action presents a question of 
law. See Maoris & Assocs,, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Ut, 2000). The court of 
appeals should review such questions for correctness, according no particular deference 
to the trial court. Id. 
"Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating issues which were once adjudicated on the merits and have 
resulted in a final judgment.'" 3D Constr. & Dev., v. Old Standard Life Ins., 117 P.3d 1082 
(Ut. App. 2005) (alteration omitted) (quoting Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678 (Ut. 2005)). In order for issue preclusion to apply, four 
elements must be present: "[1] The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must 
have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant 
action; [3] the issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly 
litigated; and [4] the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Id. 
(alterations in original). "If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there can be no 
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preclusion." Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 245 (Utah 1992). The burden 
of establishing each of the elements of res judicata is on the party invoking the doctrine. 
See PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv. Partners, 995 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App. 2000); see also 
Tirnm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993). 
Neither the Court's decision (R. 1780-1781) nor the objection filed by Mrs. 
Johnson (R. 1659-1661) discuss the four elements that must be present for issue 
preclusion to apply. The lack of any analysis on the record below should be sufficient for 
the court to remand for clarification from the trial court. 
V. Attorneys Fees Not Appropriate 
The district court entered an order awarding Mrs. Johnson attorney's fees in 
preparing for and attending the hearing of January 23, 2006 in the amount of $5,142.50. 
See Order In Re: January 23, 2006 Hearing (R. 1759 - 1761). The affidavit submitted by 
Mrs. Johnson's counsel to prepare for and attend the January 23, 2006 hearing does not 
explain the charges set forth in the affidavit and contains several hearing dates other than 
the January 23, 2006 hearing which was awarded by the district court. See Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees (R. 1650-1654). Mr. Johnson's counsel objected to the affidavit of 
attorney's fees as excessive and not applicable to the January 23, 2006 hearing. See 
Objection to Affidavit of Attorney's Fees Dated February 6, 2006 (R. 1747-1748). The 
Court found that given the history of the case and the difficulty in bringing the matter for 
hearing with the parties and their counsel present, the services rendered by Mrs. 
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Johnson's counsel were reasonably necessary to prepare for and attend the January 23, 
2006 hearing. Ruling Re: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (R. 1755-1757). In the ruling, the 
district court awarded the Petitioner the amount of $5,142.50 and entered the same in the 
Order, In Re: January 23, 2006 Hearing that was signed by the district court on February 
27,2006. (R, 1759-1761). Nothing in the district court's ruling and order set forth why 
the attorney's fee award included charges from as far back as 2004 for items such as 
''preparing a case summary" and "reviewing the file". 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests 
this Court overrule the District Court's decision upholding the Amended Decree of 
Divorce as unambiguous, enforeceable. In addition, Mr. Johnson requests that the Court 
of Appeals reverse the decision of the district court requiring Mr. Johnson to sign a trust 
deed and trust deed note that was not stipulated to by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson requests 
that the Court of Appeals find the use of contempt proceedings violates the Amended 
Decree of Divorce, which provides security in the form of a trust deed and trust deed 
note. Likewise, Mr. Johnson requests that the Court of Appeals find the use of contempt 
proceedings in this instance, where the parties have mutually agreed to secure payments 
under the Amended Decree with a trust deed, and where no alimony or child support was 
ordered, violates the Utah Constitution as discussed above. Mr. Johnson requests that the 
district court provide explanation of its finding that res judicata prevents Mr, Johnson 
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from filing his Motion to Set Aside the Divorce Decree. Finally, Mr. Johnson requests 
that the Court of Appeals reduce the award of attorney's fees to only those fees incurred 
by Mrs. Johnson's counsel in preparation for and attending the January 23, 2006 hearing. 
DATED this v day of October, 2006. 
NELSON 
CE1 ?ICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage 
prepaid, on the following: 
Rosemond G. Blakelock 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellee/Petitioner 
• # on this/y 7 day of October, 2006. 
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R o s e in o r i d B1 a k e 1 o c k #6183 
A1t o r n e y for Petitioner 
305 East 3 00 South 
Provo, Utah 8 4 606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
NA MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
)N PAUL JOHNSON, 
Responden t . 
* AMENDED 
* DECREE OF DIVORCE 
* Case No. 004401468 
* Judqe James Taylor 
This matter came before the Court on the 29;' day of May, 
200.1, before the Honorable James Taylor, as for trial on the 
issues. The parties heretofore have been granted a Bifurcated 
Decree of Divorce. Present was the Petitioner and her co-counsel, 
i<' r e d e r i c k J a c k m a n a n d Rose m o n d Blakelock. The Responde n t was a 1 s o 
present and represented by counsel, Don Petersen. 
The Court heard from the parties and accepted the 
stipulation which was read into the record. The parties and all 
counsel submitted to the Court a stipulation which drafted by 
hand by counsel for the Respondent, and accepted the additions 
which were cited .into the record by all counsel. The Court then 
inquired of both parties, on the record, whether they accepted 
the stipulation. The Court accepted their affirmation that they 
both agreed to be bound by the stipulation and accepted their 
affirmations that they understood the stipulation. The Court then 
examined the file and the contents therein and deeming itself to 
be fully informed in the premises, having issued Amended Findings 
of Fact, ow issues the following; 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The parties were previously granted a bifurcated Decree 
of Divorce and the Amended Decree shall set forth the final 
o r; d e r s i n t h i s matter. 
2. The stipulation, to be effective on and after May 2 9, 
2 0 0 1 . 
3. The Petitioner shall be awarded the following real 
property, subject to the encumbrance that existed on the real 
property on the date of the parties' separation in this matter, 
June 5, 2000. 
A. the real property and surrounding acreage located at 
5629 West 6400 North, American Fork Utah. The 
Petitioner is awarded all right and title to the house. 
I, k'l^^ft / ond appr ox imo t o 1 y S a croc—o f 1 and . The Pe 11 f i one r sha 1 1 
be solely responsible for the debt, on the real property 
that existed at the time of the parties' separation and 
sha11 hold Respondent harmless there from. Respondent 
warrants that he has placed no additional debt on the 
real property since the parties separation and 
Petitioner warrants that she has placed no additional 
debt on the property since the parties' separation. 
Respondent shall immediately sign any Quit Claim Deed 
necessary to cause the real property to be held solely 
in the name of the Petitioner. 
B. The real property and surroundinq acreage located at 
512 South 860 East, American Fork, Utah 84003. The 
Petitioner is awarded all right and title, -a^ d 
approximat.c 1 y • 5. 55—acres of—1 and . The Pe111 ioner sha 1.1 
be solely responsible for the debt on the real property 
that existed at the time of the parties' separation and 
shall hold Respondent harmless therefrom. Respondent 
warrants that he has placed no additional debt on the 
real property since the parties separation and 
Petitioner warrants that she has placed no additional 
debt on the property since the parties' separation. 
Respondent shall immediately sign any Quit Claim 
necessary to cause the real property to be held solely 
in the name of the Petitioner. 
4 . The Pet111oner shall be awarded all funds held in the 
parties' Smith Barney Account. A separate order of release to the 
Petitioner shall issue. The Court finds that the attorney's fees 
of.Frederick Jackman, Rosemond Blakelock, and Don Petersen that 
were incurred should be paid from the funds held in the Smith 
Barney Account and the remainder of the funds shall then be 
released to the Petitioner. 
5. The parties currently own in excess of eight million 
shares of stock in International Automated Systems (also known as 
IAS). The Court finds that the parties own a business known as 
XMJ-Check" . The Court finds that because a that a split of the 
International Automated Systems stock would not be practical that 
t h e P e t i 11. o n e r s h o 111 d b e a w a r d e d, a s f o r P e 111 i o n e r ' s share o f 
th e partie s s t o c k in J n t e r na 11o n a 1 Au t om a t e d System and 
Petitioner's share of the *U-Cheek" company, the sum of 
$2,800,000.00 (two million eight hundred thousand dollars), as 
well as the funds in the Smith Barney Account, as is set forth 
above. The sum of $2,800,000.00, the funds in the Smith Barney 
account, as well as the award of real property, shall be 
Petitioner's one-half share of the property settlement. The 
Respondent shall then be awarded the remaining shares in 
International Automated Systems and the business known as *U-
4 
Check", which shall be the Respondent's share of the property 
settlement. 
The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner as for her share in 
the above stated property as follows; 
a. Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of 
$8,333.33 per month, on or before the 15th of each 
month, commencing ..July 1, 200.1. 
b . An y a m o u n t s s t .i. 11 cl u e a n d o w i n g o n Ju 1 y 1, 2 0 0 6, 
sha 11 be pa id Ln fi].11 wi t:h one ba 11 oon payment due no 
late r t ha n J u1y 1, 2006. 
c. There shal] be no pre-payrnent penalty, in the case 
that the Respondent, pays the sums due and owing to 
h 
n Petitioner prior to the date of July 1, 2006. 
~
===
^j(/ d . I-fi—Hte—even t—payment—13 not 4^ ffi^ 4-y made1/ • the entire 
ba 1 an ee—^h--84-]—b^G#mfc=4ja&££^^ nd payable-, 
e. Petitioner shall be granted a secured interest in 
the *U-Check" real and personal property, to include 
all inventory, and shall be a lien holder in the second 
position behind the existinq loan at Zion's bank in the 
U-^W]r approximate balance of $6(J(.), OuO . 00 . Sec^<tnw T<? $-e ^7£l>$^ P^^v 
6. The Respondent shall be awarded all patents, patents 
pending and .ideas that he has created. 
7. The Court finds that the protective order in case number 
OOJiHO\^°lJ>^ should be dismissed and that a mutual restraining 
order shall issue, which permanently restrains both parties from 
bothering, harassing or harming each other at any time or any 
place, 
8. The Respondent shall be responsible for all debts 
associated with the parties' various business interests and 
s h o u 1 d h o 1 d t h e P e t i. t i on e r h a r rn .1 ess therefrom, i n c 1 u d i n g t h e 
business debt at Zions Bank and debts on any credit cards, which 
were incurred prior to the parties' separation, as for business 
debts. Petitioner should deliver to the Respondent a list of any 
remaining business debts of which she is aware and the Respondent 
shall then pay the debts, provided that the debt, was associated 
with the parties' business interests. 
9. Each party shall be responsible for any debt he/she 
incurred since the parties separation on June 5, 2000 and that 
each should hold the other harmless from any responsibility on 
any debs individually incurred by either party. 
10. The parties personal property should be divided, one-
half to each party. The property should be divided by the parties 
drafting a list of all personal property acquired during marriage 
and dividing the personal property equally between the parties. 
The Court finds that if the parties cannot agree to an equal 
div.is.ion of the property that the court may consider ordering t 
property sold. 
11. In consideration of the foregoing award, there should 
no award of alimony to PetitionerA^^--
DATED and signed this / I / A a V of \PfX^'-^ < 2001 
A'-A^r^ v -?> t * *< i 
BY THEAOURT 
-r^r *^r S4 , 
•7 




Roseinond Blakelock #6183 
A11omey for Pe1111oner 
305 East 300 South 
Prove, Utah 8 4 606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Prove, Utah 8460] 
INA MARIE JOHNSON, 
Petri 11oner, 
v. 
NET,DON PAUL JOHNSON, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 004401468 
J11 d qe Jam e s Ta y1o r 
This matter came before the Court; on the 2 9;; day of May, 
2 001, before the Honorable James Taylor, as for trial on the 
issues. The parties heretofore have been granted a Bifurcated 
Decree of Divorce. Present was the Petitioner and her co-counsel, 
Frederick Jackman and Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent was also 
present and represented by counsel, Don Petersen. 
The Court heard from the parties and accepted the 
stipulation which was read into the record. The parties and all 
counsel submitted to the Court a stipulation which drafted by 
hand by counsel for the Respondent, and accepted the additions 
which, were cited into the record by all counsel. The Court then 
inquired of both parties, on the record, whether they accepted 
the stipulation. The Court accepted their affirmation that they 
both agreed to be bound by the stipulation and accepted their 
affirmations that they understood the stipulation. The Court then 
examined the file and the contents therein and deeming itself to 
be fully informed in the premises, orders and rules as follows; 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . T h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t the f i n d s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s w e r e 
previously granted a bifurcated Decree of Divorce. 
2. The Court finds that the parties entered into a written 
stipulation, to be effective on and after May 29, 2001. 
3 . The Cour t f i nds t ha t 111e Pe 111 i oner shou 1 d be awa rded the 
following real property, subject to the encumbrance that existed 
on the real property on the date of the parties' separation in 
this matter, June 5, 2000. 
A. the real property and surrounding acreage located at 
5629 West 6400 North, American Fork Utah. The 
Petitioner is awarded all right and title to the house, 
0 * 
• / ^^rxC^ '3nd approximately 9 acres of—land . -The Peti11oner sha 1 J. 
be solely responsible for the debt on the real property 
that exlsted at f he time of the part;.i es ' separation and 
shall hold Respondent harmless therefrom. Respondent 
warrants that he has placed no additional debt on the 
real property since the parties separation and 
Petitioner warrants that she has placed no additional 
debt on the property since the parties' separation. 
Respondent shall immediately sign any Quit Claim Deed 
necessary to cause the real property to be held solely 
in the name o f the Pe 111 i.oner . 
B. The real property and surrounding acreaqe located at 
512 South 8 60 East, American Fork, Utah 84 003. The 
Petitioner is awarded all right and title, rB^ 
\/ approximately 5.55 acres of—1 and > The Petitioner shall, 
be solely responsible for the debt on the real property 
that existed at the time of the parties' separation and 
shall hold Respondent harm]ess therefrom. Respondent 
warrants that he has placed no. additional debt on the 
real property since the parties separation and 
Petitioner warrants that she has placed no additional 
d e b t o n t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e t: h e parties' separate, o n . 
R e spon de n t s h a 1 J. i mm e d i ate 1 y s .i g n a n y Qu i t C .1 a i m 
necessary to cause the real property to be held solely 
in the name of the Petitioner. 
The Court f inds tha t the Peti11oner shouId be awarded a 11 
eld in the parties' Smith Barney Account. A separate order 
of release to the Petitioner shall issue. The Court finds that 
the attorney's fees of Frederick Packman, Rosemond Blakelock, and 
Don Petersen that were incurred should be paid from the funds 
held in the Sm11h Barney Account and the remainder of the funds 
shall then be released to the Petitioner. 
5. The Court, finds that the parties currently own i.n excess 
of eight million shares of stock in International Automated 
Systems (also known as IAS). The Court finds that the parties 
own a business known as "fi-check". The Court finds that because a 
that a split of the International Automated Systems stock would 
not be practical that the Petitioner should be awarded, as for 
P e 111 .i. o n e r' s s h a r e o f t hi e p a r 1: i e s s t o c: k i n Internationa 1 
Automated ^System and Petitioner's share of the "U-Check" company, 
the sum of $2,800,000.00 (two million eight hundred thousand 
dollars), as well as the funds in the Smith Barney Account, as is 
set forth above. The sum of $2,800,000.00, the funds in the Smith 
Barney account, as well as the award of real property, shall be 
Petitioner's one-half share of the property settlement. The 
Respondent shall then be awarded the remaining shares in 
International Automated Systems and the business known as %Mj-




The Respondent shall pay Lhe Petitioner as for her share in 
the above stated property as follows; 
a. Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of 
$8,333.33 per month, on or before the 15'" of each 
m o n t h , c o mm e n c 1 n a < 11 ,i 1 y 1 , 2 0 01. 
b. Any amounts still due and owing on July 1, 2 006, 
shall be paid in full with one balloon payment clue no 
later than July 1, 2006. 
c. There shal.1 bo no pre-payment penalty, in the case 
that the Respondent, pays the sums due and owing to 
Petitioner prior to the date of July 1, 2006. 
d 
V ^ J&b&sr\ i * i * ^ l ^ H 1 v^c/) LLilC^Jlj.!T^lLQlL^^l-^Luj j, [ H,-i-fii i .;^ij,ijjai- -
e. Petitioner shall be granted a secured interest in 
the MJ-Check" real and personal property, to include 
all inventory, and shall be a lien holder in the second 
position behind the existing loan at Zion's bank m the 
9 approximate balance of $ 600, 000 . 00 . Jr Gv/*j ry To 3x A n ^ r ^ ^ 
. The Court finds that, the Respondent should be awarded all 
pa fen ts , pa tent s pending and idea s that he has created. 
1 . T1 he Cour I; f inds f ha t the protective order in case number 
QO ^iHO IV. T 3 s ho u 1 d be d i sm i s s ed and t h a t a mu t u a 1 r e s t r a i n l n a 
order shall issue, which permanently restrains both parties from 
w 
v 
bothering, harassing or harming each other at any time or any 
place. 
8. The Court finds that the Respondent should be responsible 
for all debts associated with the parties' various business 
int e r e st s a nd s hou J d h o1d the Pe t i t i on e r ha rm1 ess t h e re f r om, 
]n c1u d i n q t h e b u s in e s s de b t a t Zio n s Bank and debts o n a n y c redi t 
cards, which were incurred prior to the parties' separation, as 
for business debts. Petitioner should deliver to the Respondent 
a list of any remaining business debts of which she is aware and 
the Respondent shall then pay the debts, provided that the debt 
was associated with the parties' business interests. 
9. The Court finds that each party shall be responsible for 
any debt he/she incurred since the parties separation on June 5, 
2000 and that each should hold the other harmless from any 
responsibility on any debs individually incurred by either party. 
10. The Court finds that the parties personal property 
should be divided, one-half to each party. The property should be 
divided by the parties drafting a list of all personal property 
a c q i.] 1 r e d d u r i n g m a r r i a q e a n d dividing the p e r s o n a 1 - p r o p e r t y 
equally between the parties. The Court finds that if the parties 
cannot aqree to an equal division of the property that the court 
may consider ordering the property sold. 
l i . in l o n ^ K i ^ c ' t i o n c f t h e f o r e q o i n u a w a r d , t h e r e s h r u l j \ p 
"^  a v ^ i d ^ r dliiiK ij t o F e t i t i o n e r . 
R/^FD upon tfu f o r e q o m q F i n d i n q s of FCK t s , t h e TOUT t nc w 
->curs and ) rc i f r^ dc l o l U w s ; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The ( c u r t c m c l u c i c s a s a m a t t e r o i law t h a t i t h a s 
ub]oct~ irinM o r a n ] p e r s o n a l " j u r i s d i c t i o n o v o r t ho p a r t i e s and 
:Uf b ) f h f C d ^ e . 
" \ rru j u r t c i ( l u d e s as a m a t t e r OJ law t h a t t h e 
[ e t i t 1 o i e r J ^ e n t i t l e d t o an Amended D e e r e e of D i v o r c e from [}r 
He p e n d e n t , b a s e ] upon t h e g r o u n d s of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s 
-in 1 t h a t t h e r e f o r e , d d ^ q u a t e g r o u n d s e x i s t f o r t h e q r d i i t i n g of 
t hf d i v o r o e . 
;
. A D e r r p c of D i v o r c e s h o u l d be qranted nno i s s u e d wh ich i s 
( ( n s i s t e n l WJ ih Liu o r d e r s a s s e t f o r t h (Jbo\ie. 
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